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240 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
"TORTS--INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTA I S
BY CREDIT AGENCIES
Masoni v. Board of Trade of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 205
(Cal. App. 1953)
Plaintiffs' partnership was deeply indebted, but one of the partners
had sufficient personal assets to discharge the indebtedness completely.
The partners were attempting to effect a settlement with their credi-
tors for less than the full amount of their debts. Defendant board, an
association of local businessmen organized to promote co-operation
between businesses in their dealings with bad credit risks, inforled
the creditors of the wealth of the one partner, and offered the sdr-
vices of its employees as collectors. The creditors assigned their claims
to employees of the board, who, although not licensed to act as collec-
tors as required by statute,: filed separate actions and attached the
plaintiffs' personal and partnership property. Plaintiffs were forced
to abandon their attempts at settlement and to pay the full amount of
their indebtedness. This action was brought against the board and Its
employees for damages resulting from the interference with plaintiffs'
prospective business relations. A demurrer to the complaint Was
sustained by the trial court. Affirming the decision of the trial couf't,
the District Court of Appeals held that the defendants' interference
was justified.2
'A large majority of courts recognize the right to be free from in-
tentional' interference with presently existing contractual relatioils
and prospective economic advantages. 4 If the party asserting the right
can establish an intentional interference, then the interfering patt
must show that the interference was privileged in order to defeat re-
1. CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 6870 (1951).
2. *Masoni v. Board of Trade of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 205 (Cal. App. 1093).
The tourt also held that the collection without a license, although a breach of a
public duty, .was not wrongful as to the plaintiffs, because the failure ,to he
licensed in no way contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries.
3. Earlier cases, including the original case in the field of economic. bnter-
"ference, Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 F. & B. 216, spoke in terms of a. malicious
-interference. See, e.g., McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447 (1888). Malice was
there used in'the sense of ill-will. The general rule today is that an unjustified
interference constitutes legal malice and that is the only requirement necessary
for recovery. Kamm v. Flink. 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 AtI. 62 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934) ;
Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N.Y. 418, 125 N.E. 817 (1920) ; Hutton v. Watters,
132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 135 (1915). 1
4. Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (4th Cir. 1912) ; Kamm v. Plink, 113 N.X;L. 582,
175 At. 62 "(Ct. Err. & App. 1934). RESTATMWENT, TORTS § 766 (1939). But of.
Brooks v. Patterson 234 Ky. 757, 29 S.W.2d 26 (1930), where the court held that
when no cdzitract is involved, the act must be illegal before there is any liability.
PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (1941), suggests that the only real difference between the
liability for' ihducing breach of "contract and interfering with prospective' ad-
vantages is 'that in the latter situation the privileges are broader and include
the right of competition.
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covery.1 Dean Prosser states that courts recognize a privilege to in-
terfere with both prospective advantages and contractual relationships
for the disinterested protection of third persons or the general public,
or for the protection of the defendant's own property interests, or
by bona fide law suit, or by complaint to public authorities. 6 Inter-
ference with prospective advantages by fair competition is privileged,7
but a competitive motive will not excuse interference with contractual
relations. No interference is privileged which is predominantly mali-
cious,' or which is illegally effected.'
Most cases concerning credit agencies have not been based on inten-
tional interference with business relations, 1 but have arisen on the
related theories of defamation, right of privacy, or causation of emo-
tional disturbance. In defamation cases the courts have held that a
credit association has a privilege to publish to members the names of
5. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603 (1905); Mogul S.S. Co. v.
McGregor Gow and Co., [1892] 23 Q.B.D. 598. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 767 (1934),
suggests that the following elements be considered in determining whether there
is a privilege to act: 1. the actor's conduct; 2. the interest interfered with; 3. the
relation between various parties; 4. the interest that the actor sought to advance;"
5. the social value of each interest.
6. PRossE, ToRTs 1019, 1020 (1941). In the principal case the justification
for the credit association's conduct would be that it was intended for the pro-
tection of third parties or the public in general. The cases, which Dean Prosser
cites as authority for the recognition of a privilege to act in the interest of third
parties, generally deal with facts very dissimilar from the principal case.
Cases involving credit agencies have largely arisen in related fields of tort and
not in actions for intentional interference. An examination of these related fields,
see note 9 infra and text, discloses that a privilege is accorded to credit agencies.
The same problems and criteria for determining privileges are present in torts for
interference and these other torts, and therefore it would seem a reasonable as-
sumption that the same decision as to whether there is a privilege or not would
result in an action for intentional interference.
7. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., 268 Fed. 121(D. Del. 1920); Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 87 AtL 927(1913); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927).
8. Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1953). Goldman v. Hart-
ford Road Bldg. Assn., 150 Md. 677, 133 At]. 843 (1926); Mogul S.S. Co. v.
McGregor Gow and Co., [1892] 23 Q.B.D. 598.
9. Boggs v. Duncan Schnell Furniture, 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W. 482 (1913);
Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). Even though a privilege
would normally arise under a given state of facts, it will be invalidated if malice
in the sense of ill-will is present. See note 2 supra, and compare this type of
malice with legal malice.
10. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)(plagiarism) ; Kendall v. Lively, 94 Colo. 483, 31 P.2d 343 (1934) (defamation);
Kraus v. Pacter & Co., 134 Misc. 247, 234 N.Y. Supp. 687 (1929) (bribery).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS * 767, comment b (1934), says "... . the issue is not simply
whether the actor is privileged to cause the harm but rather whether he is privi-
leged to cause it in the manner in which he does it...."
11. The only cases in which interference was the theory on which the collection
agency was held liable have been in a limited area, chiefly consisting of employ-
ment cases where creditors told the employer that their employees owed them
money. In Warschauser v. Brooklyn Furniture Co., 159 App. Div. 81, 144 N.Y.
Supp. 257 (1913), there was an actual debt. More typically, however, the cases
were further complicated by the fact that the validity of the debt was at best
questionable. Hill Grocery v. Carroll, 223 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (1931) ; Surrez v.
McFall Bros., 87 S.W. 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
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debtors if it does so with a bona fide intent to protect its members
from bad credit risks.- Where the truth of the libel is not raised as
a defense, or in jurisdictions where truth is not an absolute defense,
courts have held that an action for defamation will lie where it was
found that the association published the facts of a debt to all its mem-
bers primarily for the purpose of coercing payment by the debtor."
In jurisdictions where truth is an absolute defense to a defamation
action, recovery has been allowed in similar situations by employing
the recent and less well-defined theory of a right to privacy. 4 In
addition to placing these restrictions on publication, the courts have
looked with increasingly jaundiced eyes" on other methods of collec-
tion and have held credit agencies liable for causing emotional dis-
turbances. While the elements of such liability are still uncertain, the
cases where recovery has been allowed have involved flagrant misbe-
haviour16 on the part of the collector which produced serious injury. T
In the principal case, the defendants were functioning both as a
credit association, by informing the creditors of the plaintiffs' financial
standing, and as a collection agency. The court held that the defend-
ants' conduct in performing both functions was privileged, 18 and that
the fact that the defendants received compensation did not destroy
the privilege.1" The court also held that the absence of a license in no
way contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries and therefore should have
12. Putnal v. Inman, 76 Fla. 553 (1918); Ideal Motor Co. v. Warfield, 211 Ky.
576, 277 S.W. 862 (1925). See PRossEa, TORTS § 94 (1941). The needs of business
require a knowledge of the would-be borrowers' financial standing which the
small business man obviously could not hope to acquire independently of any
expert aid.
13. Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454, 56 N.E. 619 (1900); Traynor v.
Seilaff, 62 Minn. 420, 64 N.W. 915 (1895); Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46
N.W. 123 (1890).
14. Brent v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Quina v. Roberts,
16 So.2d 558 (La. 1944). Contra: Judevine v. Benzies-Montayne Fuel & Ware-
house Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).
15. See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir.
1939).
16. Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932)(threats); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La. 1944) (letter to employer);
La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1936) (recur-
ring letters).
17. The majority of courts hold that there must be some accompanying physical
injury before they will find liability. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern R.R. v.
Taylor, 84 Ark. 42, 104 S.W. 551 (1907); Grayson v. St. Louis Transit Co., 100Mo. App. 60, 71 S.W. 730 (1903); Kirby v. Jules Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E.
625 (1936). RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948), however, recognizes liability
where only mental anguish results. See note 16 supra, for examples of recentcollection cases that have permitted recovery where no physical injury resulted.
S15. Masoni v. Board of Trade of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 205, 208 (Cal. App.1953). The court cited RESTATEMENT TORTS § 767 (1939).
19. See note 9 supra, for the effect of an improper motive on privilege. In the
rixicipal case tye defendant's conduct was not sufficiently bad to warrant lia-
bility indepdndent of an action for interference. If the cour had found such
tortious conduct, then the privilege to interfere would have been vitiated. I
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENTS 243
no bearing on the question of the defendants' liability to the plain-
tiffs.zo
The result in the principal case appears to be fair and reasonable be-
cause credit agencies perform a useful function and in the perform-
ance of that function they must of necessity interfere with the pros-
pective advantages of debtors. The basis of the relational tort the-
ories, such as interference with contractual relations, interference
with prospective advantages, interference with the right of privacy,
and causation of emotional disturbance, is a recognition that in a suc-
cessful society normally protected privileges may have to be restricted
when they curtail other more desirable action. The very essence of
these relational torts, the subjective weighing of two conflicting in-
terests, makes set rules not only impractical but undesirable.
20. The court's analysis in the principal case followed the general rationale
employed in negligence cases where the defendant has failed to obey the state's
rquirement of a license to practice a profession or to drive a car. Opple v. Ray,
8 nd. 450, 195 N.E. 81 (1953); Corbett v. Scott, 243 N.Y. 66, 152 N.E. 467(196) ; Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 161 N.E. 197 (1926).
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